Introduction
In the late 1970s the Chinese leadership, motivated by economic stagnation, low productivity, and disguised unemployment in both rural and urban sectors, embarked on a program of economic reform which initiated a process of gradual transition to a market economy and resulted in two decades of remarkable change. At the macroeconomic level improvements in income and welfare were rapid and sustained-real per capita GDP increased more than fivefold from 1978 till 2000 (NBS, Table 3-4, p.58) and hundreds of millions were lifted out of absolute poverty. The benefits of reform, however, have been distributed unevenly --inequality has risen rapidly in recent years. The eastern seaboard provinces developed at a much faster rate than the interior and western provinces (Chen and Fleisher 1996 , Fleisher and Chen 1997 , Gustafsson and Li 1998 , Lee 2000 . The urban/rural income gap widened. The gender wage gap also increased (Maurer-Fazio, Rawski, and Zhang, Maurer-Fazio and Hughes). We are interested in the question of how China's different ethnic groups have fared in the reforms.
According to the 2000 Census, the 106.43 million ethnic minority people in China constituted only 8.47 % of the Chinese population (Table 1) . When we use the terms ethnic minority, national minority or minority people here we are referring to the 55 national minorities that, with the Han majority, make up the 56 ethnic groups officially recognized by the Chinese central government.
According to the Information Office of the State Council, minority groups are identified on the basis of past and current conditions, scientific principles, and the wishes of a given ethnic group regardless of the sizes of its inhabited areas or population. (p.9). The Chinese government initially used a set of four characteristics-common territory, language, economy, and culture --developed by Joseph Stalin to identify its national minority groups (Smith, p.273) . However, members of an ethnic minority group often do not fulfill all four of these characteristics and in practice the Chinese government has allowed group members to claim ethnic minority status based on ancestry. Smith reports, "The government has ruled that anyone with at least one minority parent or grandparent can be reclassified as a minority person" (p.278). Hoddie reports that 24 million more people identified themselves as ethnic minorities in the 1990 census than in the 1982 census. He further claims that fertility trends were such that an increase of only 10 million was expected. He argues that government policy increased the benefits to minority identification and thus provided an incentive for change in ethnic identity. 1 The government's preferential policies include an exemption from, or easing of, the restrictions of the government's family planning program, as well as preferential treatment in school admissions, hiring and promotion, the financing and taxation of businesses and the provision of infrastructure (Sautman, p.86) . Whether and how these policies are implemented is a key issue. Gilley reports that in Xinjiang, the benefits of the central government's western development campaign accrue in large part to the area's Han population and that Han firms simply do not hire Uygur workers. Although overall economic indicators indicate an improved standard of living in ethnic minority regions, it appears that the improvements have not always kept pace with developments in the national economy. Measured average annual employment wages and rural per capita income both rose at slower rates in ethnic minority autonomous areas than in the nation as a whole. 3 Figures reported in Mackerras (p.66) claim both a reduction in the number of officially impoverished ethnic minority people from 45 million to 14 million in the period from 1994 to 1999 and a recognition that minority peoples still make up 36.5 % of those remaining in absolute poverty as of 2000.
A great deal of the recent scholarship on China's minorities such as Stevan Harrell's work on the Yi and Dru Gladney's work on the Hui has tended to concentrate on one minority at a time, though some authors, such as Colin Mackerras, have focused on the minorities as a whole. In any event, socioeconomic treatises on China's ethnic groups are rare. One notable exception is the work of Gustafsson and Li who make an important contribution to the economic literature about China's minority nationalities. They employ survey data from 19 provinces in 1988 and 1995 to assess the differences in rural income between the Han majority and ethnic minorities (grouped together). They find that the per capita income gap of 19.2% in the earlier period grew to 35.9% in the latter period. When they decompose the income differential into differences due to endowments and treatment they find that the vast majority of the differential is due to differences in endowments and that minority incomes are lower than Han incomes largely due to location. Gustafsson and Li note that China's minorities are clustered in provinces with low per capital GDP and that they tend to dwell in mountainous areas and areas officially designated as poor. 4 Hannum and Xie focus on an array of minorities in a single province. They employ census data to examine the effects of market reform on differences in occupational attainment of Xinjiang's (mainly Turkic) minorities in comparison to the Han. Hannum and Xie find that the ethnic gap in occupational attainment between the Han and the minorities widened between the 1982 and 1990 censuses. They attribute the rising gap to an increased gap in educational attainment between the Han and the minorities and a strengthening of the relationship between educational attainment and higher-status occupations.
The papers of Gustafsson and Li and Hannum and Xie suggest that minorities are not faring well in China's transition-both income and occupational attainment gaps are widening.
The former paper suggests that geography is a very important contributing factor in explaining differences in majority minority incomes. The latter suggests important ethnic differences in labor market outcomes even after carefully controlling for location. We are particularly 76 to 1626 yuan while national figures indicate an increase in per capita net rural income from 191 to 2253 yuan. (NSB 1993, 2003 and SEAC) . 4 Unfortunately Gustafsson and Li's survey data do not include observations from Tibet or Xinjiang.
4 interested in whether the differences in majority and minority economic outcomes are the result of minority status per se, or whether they are an artifact of local economic conditions in the minority areas. There is little published data to help shed light on questions about the economic well being of China's minority peoples.
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Research Strategy
By employing newly available individual data from the 1982, 1990, and 2000 Population Censuses of China we are able to surmount some of the previous data scarcity problems.
Unfortunately, the population censuses do not report income. In our larger research project we therefore concentrate on available measures of economic status--labor force participation, educational attainment, and unemployment and occupational attainment. We utilize the census data to compare the economic status of each minority to that of other minorities and to that of the majority Han. By using data that span the reform period we are able to observe how these measures of economic status change over the course of the reforms. In this paper, we focus our analysis on just one of these measures--labor force participation--and examine the interactions of ethnicity and geography.
In the next section we discuss our theoretical predictions about how the reforms might influence labor force participation rates. We follow with descriptive statistics revealing how the labor force participation rates of China's largest 19 ethnic groups have changed over the course of the reforms based on the three most recent population censuses. We then estimate urban labor force participation rates using probit regressions controlling for sex, marital status, educational attainment, age, ethnicity, and location. These regressions allow us to determine if the participation rates of particular ethnic groups differ from that of the Han majority and whether there are any discernible trends in such differences over time. in the labor market also allowed managers more freedom to engage in discriminatory practices. If the state was effectively protecting minorities from labor market discrimination in the pre-reform period, it is quite possible that, in the reform period, we observe increased discrimination against minorities. 7 We were also particularly interested in the Tibetans. We do not include our analysis of urban Tibetans' labor force participation rates here since the 1990 census sample we received does not include any observations from the major cities of the Tibetan Autonomous Region. draw significant numbers of new workers into the labor force, as not too many adults were outside the labor force in the pre-reform period. Given the amount of inefficiency in the use of labor and other resources during the socialist period, output could increase simply through more efficient use of the existing labor force.
Labor force participation for certain groups could actually fall as a result of three phenomena. As incomes rose during the 1990s, especially in the urban regions, women may have withdrawn from the labor force to concentrate their efforts in home production. Where spouses' earning power is sufficiently high, families may feel able to meet their income goals with only one income, freeing women from the need to work outside the home. Finally, and importantly for the focus of this paper, with a relaxation of the protections afforded workers in the socialist period, managers may have begun to indulge prejudices against particular ethnic groups by refusing to hire or quickly firing members of these groups. If such practices are widespread, members of disadvantaged groups could become 'discouraged workers' and withdraw from the labor force. In the following section, we describe the data we utilize to test these hypotheses.
Data Description
The data employed in this project are drawn from the three most recent population censuses of China. Our analysis is based on one percent micro data samples of the 1982 and 1990 censuses and a 0.095 percent micro data sample of the 2000 census. 10 Since we focus on labor issues, we further sample our data to include only those age 15 and above.
Ethnicity is reported directly on the census questionnaires. Since no new ethnic minority groups have been officially recognized since the Jino in 1979, the number of ethnic groups is consistent across all 3 censuses. In the work that follows, statistics are calculated for each of the 56 recognized ethnic groups but to keep tables to manageable size we report individual results only for the 19 groups with populations exceeding one million members (as of the 1990 and 2000 censuses).
Individuals are considered to be in the labor force if they had a job on the day of the census or if they were unemployed and looking for work at that time. We equate those classified as "waiting for work" in the earlier censuses as seeking employment and thus part of the labor force.
The definitions used in each of the three censuses to classify individuals as urban or rural census contain only the first four digits of the administrative code, precluding use of the same categorization scheme. In any event, the 2000 census uses a much newer and more sophisticated set of criteria to define urban areas (Chan and Hu, p. 54) . 12 The 2000 sample reports individuals as residing in "city", "town", or "rural" areas. We aggregate those in cities and towns into an urban category constituting 36.9 percent of the population, all others are classified as rural.
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The educational attainment categories in the 1982 data vary somewhat from those in the two later censuses. The 1982 categorization of illiterate and semi-literate, primary, junior middle school, senior middle school, some college and college graduate was amended in the later censuses to also include technical middle school and junior college. We thus aggregate the different types of senior middle schools and all types of post-secondary education into just two categories and thus impose consistency in our educational classification scheme.
Results and Discussion
Results Based on Analysis of Descriptive Statistics
Labor force participation rates for each of China's largest ethnic groups are presented in Table 2 . Table 4 -6, p.352 12 These criteria are based on the population density and whether the area is a seat of local government or is contiguous to an area where the government is located. 13 We recognize that these definitions of urban and rural are not consistent over time. They are, however, the best that we can do with our existing data sources.
slightly in 1990 before falling to 76.90 percent in 2000 (Table 2 ). The total population figures of course mimic the trend for the majority Han population. Minority labor force participation rates differ from those of the Han, however. Of note, the LFPR of the Yi, Zhuang, and Uygurs, is consistently higher than that of the Han. In 2000, the Han LFPR was 76.57, compared to 88.29
for the Yi, 82.94 for the Zhuang and 79.10 for Uygurs ( Figure 1 and Table 2 ).
Only a few minorities exhibited significant swings in LFPR over the period. The
Manchu LFPR rose from 69.40 percent in 1982 to 74.02 percent in 1990 and then leveled off.
This rather steep increase in the Manchu LFPR occurred over the period in which many individuals with Manchu ancestry began to identify as such (See Table 1 . labor force participation patterns are also consistent but very different from urban ones. Figure 3 and Table 3b reveal an increase in rural LFP between 1990 and 2000.)
An interesting question is whether the decline in urban LFP between 1990 and 2000, which affected every group, was due to the income effect (higher income leading to lower LFP) or discouraged workers (unemployed individuals who stop searching for work). While the limited set of variables included in the census data precludes the derivation of a definitive answer, examining the LFPR of urban females is often suggestive of the strength of the income effect. In other parts of the world it is often the case that as the incomes of urban males rise, there is less need for spouses to work outside the home, as families satisfy their needs with single incomes. So, one possible manifestation of the income effect would be a sharp decline in the 14 We wish to thank Xiao-Yuan Dong for bringing the location effect to our attention.
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LFPR of urban females while that of urban males stays constant or rises. Such a difference could be evidence of married urban females reducing their commitment to market work in order to devote more time to home production. Tables 4a and 4b show the LFPR for urban males and females by ethnic group for 1982, 1990, and 2000. There are sharp drops between 1990 and 2000 in both male and female urban LFPR for all ethnic groups, albeit the decline is sharper for women than for men. These results are consistent with a manifestation of the income effect. However they could also indicate that urban women become discouraged workers and exit the labor force more readily than urban men. We know that women are laid off disproportionately (Maurer Fazio, forthcoming, and Maurer-Fazio, Rawski, and Zhang) and expect this factor to contribute to the discouraged worker effect. It is interesting to note that the decline in the LFP of Koreans is more marked than for other groups. The extent of this decline in Korean LFP is surprising given that the education levels of the Koreans far exceed those of any other ethnic group. 15 This phenomenon once again raises the question of how much of what we observe for each ethnic group is attributable to ethnicity and how much is due to geographic location-a question we try to address in the following section.
Figures 4 and 5 and
Results of Probit Regressions based on National Data
We ran a series of probit regressions for urban residents on a labor force participation binary dependent variable. For ease of exposition, the results for all probit models are presented as changes in the probability of labor force participation, and not the probit regression coefficient. For binary variables, the table entries represent the discrete change in probability as the binary independent variable is toggled from zero to one. For continuous variables such as age, the table entries are the change in the probability of labor force participation resulting from a one unit change in the independent variable. All probabilities are calculated at the sample mean. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in our analyses. Our basic results also show a marked decline in the difference in labor force participation between married and unmarried individuals. In 1982, married individuals were almost 37 percent more likely to be in the labor force than the unmarried. By 2000, this difference in the probability of participation had dropped to only seven percent. Given the overall decline in labor force participation over the period, this result is perhaps due to the rate of married individuals, especially women, falling to a level of labor force participation closer to that of single individuals.
Basic Probit Regressions
The effects of education on the probability of labor force participation are both interesting and puzzling. In 1982, all of the table entries for the educational binary variables are negative and highly significant, indicating that all of these groups are less likely to be in the labor force than junior middle school graduates, the omitted category. The probability of labor force participation is not terribly different from the omitted category for primary and senior middle school graduates. The largest, and most puzzling difference, is for postsecondary graduates, the category representing the most highly educated Chinese. Member of this group are 22
percentage points less likely to be in the labor force relative to the omitted category. Such relatively low labor force participation rates for college graduates is contrary to basic human capital theory, which predicts higher labor force participation to recoup the investment in additional education. We hypothesize that this result for postsecondary graduates may indicate residual effects of the repression of the educated during the Cultural Revolution. While the worst of the Cultural Revolution had ended a decade earlier, perhaps older college graduates did not return to the labor force either out of fear of further repression, or simply that they were supported by other family members.
After mostly shrinking between 1982 and 1990, these anomalous results almost completely reversed by 2000. Educational categories other than postsecondary are now somewhat more likely to be in the labor force than junior middle school graduates. The probability that a postsecondary graduate is in the labor force is now not significantly different from the omitted category. Except for the anomalous results for postsecondary education, the results for 2000 are more consistent with basic human capital theory.
Basic Probit Regressions Augmented with Ethnicity and Location
To examine the effect of ethnicity on labor force participation, we added 18 binary variables to the basic regression representing the largest ethnic minority groups, plus a 19 th variable indicating membership in one of the smaller remaining ethnic minorities. We used the majority Han as the omitted category, so all results for ethnicity should be interpreted as relative to the Han. The results of these regressions are presented in Table 7 .
We control for local economic conditions by adding binary variables for each of the Chinese provinces. We use Jiangsu province as the reference category.
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Addition of the ethnicity variables has little or no effect on the size, sign or significance any of the basic variables in the regression. This is most likely due to the fact that over 80 percent of the sample in any given year is made up of majority Han. As the table entries for the basic variables reflect the experience of the Han, controlling for ethnic minority membership has little influence on these results.
Several of the ethnic minorities show large, statistically significant differences with the Han in the probability of labor force participation. For example, the Dong and Mongolians are 24 and 3 percentage points lower, respectively, in the probability of labor force participation in 1982 than the Han. Conversely, the Yi and the Miao are 10 and 7 percentage points higher in the probability of labor force participation in 1982 than the Han. These differences from the Han participation either shrank or became statistically indistinguishable by 2000. Other ethnic minorities, notably the Hui, Tibetans, Uygurs and Koreans saw their probability of labor force participation worsen by 2000 relative to the Han majority. This relative decrease in labor force participation by these and other ethnic minorities could represent workers discouraged by an emergence of ethnic discrimination following economic reform. Conversely, since these three groups are concentrated in very few provinces, this relative decline in labor force participation could also be an artifact of local economic conditions. We examine this possibility in the next section.
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Probit Regression Results for Specific Ethnic Minorities based on Regions of Principal Residence
Hui
Probit results for the Hui minority (in areas of principal residence) are presented in Table   8 . The Hui are geographically more dispersed than any of the other large minorities --19% of the Hui reside in Ningxia, 12% in Gansu, 10% in Henan, 8% in Qinghai, 7% in Yunnan, 5% in Hebei, 5% in Shandong…. labor force participation relative to the Han. These results suggest that when we focus our analysis on the geographic areas of concentration for the Hui, we observe a fairly substantial change, the Hui were more likely to be in the labor force than their Han neighbors in 1990 but less likely in 2000.
Koreans
The vast majority of ethnic Koreans in China live in China's Northeast-60% in Jilin, 20% in Heilongjiang and 13% in Liaoning. 18 We thus create sub-samples of each of our census data sets consisting only of residents of these three provinces to compare the labor force participation rates of Koreans in China's Northeast to those of other ethnic groups who live in the same geographic areas.
14 We first note that the patterns of labor force participation of the residents of China's Northeast are different in many ways from the national patterns discussed above. (See Table 9 .)
Men in this region are even more likely than women to be in the labor force than for the country as whole. The differential in men's participation rates over women's in this region starts at 18%
in 1982 Focusing now on the effects of ethnicity on labor force participation in the Northeast (Table 9) , we see there is no discernable effect of being Korean in 1982 and 1990 but that in 2000, ethnic Koreans are 6% less likely to participate in the labor market than the Han. In 2000, the Koreans are the only major ethnic group in the Northeast to have labor force participation rates that are distinguishable from the Han.
It is interesting to note that the change in the labor force participation rate differentials for Mongolians in these 3 provinces moves in just the opposite direction from that of the Koreans.
Mongolians have significantly lower participation rates than the Han in 1982 and 1990 but by 2000 their participation rates increases to the point that they are indistinguishable from the Han.
Manchus
The Manchus are geographically distributed over six of China's northern and northeastern provinces-50% in Liaoning, 20% in Hebei, 10% in Heilongjiang, 9% in Jilin, 5%
in Inner Mongolia, and 2% in Beijing. 19 The results discussed below are based on sub-samples of our census data sets that consist of urban residents of these six provinces.
The patterns of labor force participation for the urbanites of these six provinces follow the directional trends of the national data. (See Table 10 .) The differentials in rates of labor force Overall, there are few discernable differences in the labor force participation of particular ethnic group in these provinces. In Table 10 we see that the Manchus were approximately 1.5% less likely than the Han who reside in the same areas to participate in the labor force in 1990
only. In other years, the labor force participation rates of the Han and Manchu are statistically indistinguishable.
Mongolians
China's ethnic Mongolians reside mainly in Inner Mongolia (69%), Liaoning (12%), Jilin (3%), Hebei (3%), Xinjiang (3%), and Heilongjiang (2%). 20 The probit results based on data for these areas are presented in Table 11 . The male-female differential is larger for residents of these provinces than that of the nation as a whole for each of the census years. Conversely, the married-unmarried differential for residents of these provinces is smaller than that of the country 
Uygurs
China's Uygur population is heavily concentrated in Xinjiang (99%). 21 We therefore restrict our sub-sample to Xinjiang and compare patterns of labor force participation across ethnic groups within that region. In comparing the labor force patterns of Xinjiang residents to the national data, we observe that the male-female differential is already quite high in 1982-
19% and yet rises to 27% by 2000. (See Table 12 .) The differential in participation rates for Looking at the ethnicity results in Table 12 we find some quite remarkable changes across the census years. In 1982 the labor force participation rate of the Uygurs was indistinguishable from that of the Han, while by 1990, the Uygurs were 9% more likely than the Han to be in the labor force. In a complete reversal, by 2000 the Han were 9% more likely than the Uygurs to be in the labor force. The labor force participation rates of the Kazaks and the Hui were indistinguishable from that of the Han in 2000.
Yi
The Yi reside predominantly in the three southwestern provinces of Yunnan (61%), Sichuan (27%) and Guizhou (11%). 22 There are some differences in the patterns of labor force participation of the urban residents of these provinces from those of the national data. (See Table   13 .) First, the differential in male-female participation rates stays fairly constant at 9-10% over Examining the ethnicity results in Table 13 , we see that in 1982 and 1990 the Yi living in these 3 southwestern provinces were 6-7% more likely to be in the labor force than the Han but equally likely in 2000. By 2000, we see the Bai and the Bouyei, respectively, are 10-14% more 18 likely to be in the labor force than the Han while the Hui and Dong are 12-17% less likely, respectively.
Zhuang
The Zhuang, the largest of China's ethnic minorities in terms of population, reside in the south of China. The majority of the Zhuang live in Guangxi (88%), Yunnan (7%) and Guangdong (4%). 23 The urban residents of these three provinces have labor force participation patterns that diverge substantially from national trends. In 2000, married individuals were less likely to be in the labor force than their unmarried counterparts (See Table 14 ). This is the geographic area where we observe this result. The increase in the male-female differential is more muted in these provinces than in the nation as a whole, starting out at 9% in 1982 and rising to 19% by 2000.
The Zhuang are 4% more likely to be in the labor force than the Han in 1990 and 2000.
By 2000, the Bai of this region are 9% more likely to be in the labor force than the Han, while the Yi's labor force participation rate is indiscernible from the Han.
Concluding Comments
If geography and local conditions, rather than ethnicity, are responsible for the differences in labor force participation between ethnic groups observed in the national data, such differences should narrow or disappear when geographic location is properly controlled. We controlled for geographical differences by restricting the sample for each ethnic group under study to those provinces where most members of that group reside.
While our geographically restricted regressions reveal sizable differences from the national results in terms of the effects of the human capital, sex and marriage variables on labor force participation, we cannot conclude that the apparent ethnic differentials in labor force participation are primarily the result of regional variation and local conditions. For example, the marginal change in labor force participation attributable to being Korean is about the same in the In contrast, the effect of being Zhuang appears to be robust-the Zhuang remain 4% more likely than the Han to be in the labor force in both 1990 and 2000.
Thus, we find that geography has limited explanatory power is explaining differences in the probability of labor force participation between the larger Chinese ethnic minorities and the majority Han. For some groups in some years, location explains some of the differences in labor force participation. But geography does not explain the largest disparities such as those between the Han and Koreans. We find ourselves unable to make any generalizations about the causal factors underlying the significant differences in labor force participation rates of particular ethnic groups in China. Entries are the change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force when the binary variable toggles from zero to one, evaluated at the sample mean Entries for age and age squared are the marginal change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force resulting from a one unit change, evaluated at the sample mean.
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Asterisks indicate the significance of the underlying probit coefficient. *** indicates significance at the one percent level or better; ** indicates significance at the five percent level; * indicates significance at the ten percent level. Entries are the change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force when the binary variable toggles from zero to one, evaluated at the sample mean Entries for age and age squared are the marginal change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force resulting from a one unit change, evaluated at the sample mean.
Asterisks indicate the significance of the underlying probit coefficient. *** indicates significance at the one percent level or better; ** indicates significance at the five percent level; * indicates significance at the ten percent level. Entries are the change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force when the binary variable toggles from zero to one, evaluated at the sample mean Entries for age and age squared are the marginal change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force resulting from a one unit change, evaluated at the sample mean. Asterisks indicate the significance of the underlying probit coefficient. 562 Entries are the change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force when the binary variable toggles from zero to one, evaluated at the sample mean Entries for age and age squared are the marginal change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force resulting from a one unit change, evaluated at the sample mean. 579 Entries are the change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force when the binary variable toggles from zero to one, evaluated at the sample mean. Entries for age and age squared are the marginal change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force resulting from a one unit change, evaluated at the sample mean.
Asterisks indicate the significance of the underlying probit coefficient. *** indicates significance at the one percent level or better; ** indicates significance at the five percent level; * indicates significance at the ten percent level. 581 Entries are the change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force when the binary variable toggles from zero to one, evaluated at the sample mean. Entries for age and age squared are the marginal change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force resulting from a one unit change, evaluated at the sample mean. Asterisks indicate the significance of the underlying probit coefficient. *** indicates significance at the one percent level or better; ** indicates significance at the five percent level; * indicates significance at the ten percent level. 620 Entries are the change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force when the binary variable toggles from zero to one, evaluated at the sample mean Entries for age and age squared are the marginal change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force resulting from a one unit change, evaluated at the sample mean.
Asterisks indicate the significance of the underlying probit coefficient. *** indicates significance at the one percent level or better; ** indicates significance at the five percent level; * indicates significance at the ten percent level. 657 Entries are the change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force when the binary variable toggles from zero to one, evaluated at the sample mean. Entries for age and age squared are the marginal change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force resulting from a one unit change, evaluated at the sample mean.
Asterisks indicate the significance of the underlying probit coefficient. *** indicates significance at the one percent level or better; ** indicates significance at the five percent level; * indicates significance at the ten percent level. Entries are the change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force when the binary variable toggles from zero to one, evaluated at the sample mean. Entries for age and age squared are the marginal change in the probability that an individual is in the labor force resulting from a one unit change, evaluated at the sample mean.
Asterisks indicate the significance of the underlying probit coefficient. *** indicates significance at the one percent level or better; ** indicates significance at the five percent level; * indicates significance at the ten percent level. 
